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Abstract : Public authorities often invoke the precautionary principle to ban or postpone the 
development of innovative projects with uncertain but potentially harmful irreversible impacts on the 
environment or health. As stated in the Rio declaration, the precautionary principle suggests 
balancing costs and benefits associated with irreversible decisions while taking account of the 
perspective to acquire better but costly information in the future. Though the real option theory seems 
to be an appropriate tool to deal with the precautionary principle it has two important limits with this 
respect. First it focuses on Markovian processes rather than on Bayesian learning. Second, it 
disregards the role of preferences whereas preferences are at the core of the seemingly linked concept 
of precautionary saving. The article is an attempt to circumvent these two limits. A canonical model 
of Bayesian real option expressed in terms of intertemporal utility maximisation is presented and 
solved. The optimal decision rule is discussed in the light of the precautionary principle. It is then 
shown how to switch consistently to an equivalent problem expressed in terms of costs and benefits. 
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PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND THE COST BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS OF INNOVATIVE PROJECTS 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Implications from the use of new technologies are often ambivalent. On the one hand 
new technologies are by essence intended to satisfy human needs and, as such, they generate 
benefits. On the other hand, unforeseen effects on the environment and health may appear. 
Impacts on the environment associated to the use of Genetically Modified Organism in 
agriculture or consequences on health of the use of cellular phones are among the most often 
quoted and analysed examples. Facing the decision whether to allow or ban new technologies 
in the presence of suspicions of harmful effects on the environment and/or health, public 
authorities in Europe generally invoke the precautionary principle to argue in favour of a, at 
least temporary, ban. The precautionary principle they referred to is that defined at the earth 
summit that took place at Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Indeed, principle fifteen of Rio declaration 
states that “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation”
1
. Similar definitions have been enacted in other national or 
international laws (see Gollier 2001 or Immordino 2003). From an economist point of view 
there are three key concepts embedded in the Rio conference definition. The first key concept 
is that of irreversibility. If damages were not irreversible, inappropriate decisions could be 
corrected and associated costs could be avoided thanks to a feedback effect. Irreversibility 
makes such a correction ineffective and thus strengthens the effects of an inappropriate 
decision. The second key concept is that of a lack of full scientific certainty. Scientific 
knowledge is not exogenous but cumulates through time as the result of a costly research 
activity. Thus the first two key concepts call for a dynamic approach to the precautionary 
principle. The third key concept is that of cost-effectiveness. It implicitly means public 
authorities have to balance costs and benefits. Surprisingly, how to balance costs and benefits 
in the presence of potential irreversible harmful effects and scientific evolving knowledge is 
not much detailed in the economic literature. 
Since the seminal articles by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974) and the 
clarification made by Hanemann (1989), economists generally invoke the “irreversibility 
effect” to explain that the more uncertain we are about future returns from an irreversible 
project, the more the postponement of the project is relevant. The “irreversibility effect” has 
received much attention due to the ability to implement it to irreversible investment choices 
                                                 
1
 Full text of the Rio declaration was available in February 2011 at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163 
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thanks to the real option theory synthesized in the now well known articles and textbook by 
Pindyck (1991), Dixit (1992), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Although the real option theory 
is originally build on a comparison with financial options (see, for instance, the pioneering 
works of McDonald and Siegel 1986 or Brennan and Schwartz 1985), its relationship with the 
concept of options and the “irreversibility effect” originally developed and clarified by Arrow 
Fisher Henry and Hanemann (AFHH) has been outlined, among others, by Lund (1991) and 
Fisher (2000). The real option theory is commonly quoted in works dealing with the 
precautionary principle but it has never been applied, to our knowledge, to explicitly model it. 
We suggest two ways to explain this paradox. 
First, as noted by Ulph and Ulph (1997), assumptions about stochastic variables made 
in the real option theory are not appropriate for a wide range of economic problems implying 
both irreversibility and uncertainty. The reason for this is that the real option theory focuses 
on problems where independent exogenous and repeated shocks affect the evolution of a key 
variable in the decision of whether to develop or postpone an irreversible project. This 
approach, thereafter called Markovian approach, is relevant to deal with uncertainty affecting 
future prices but it is not suitable to deal with uncertainty about an unknown parameter, the 
true value of which is invariant with time. The latter kind of problems entails an analysis in 
terms of Bayesian uncertainty. The matter is that, in its primary version, the concept of option 
introduced by Arrow and Fisher (1974) is sufficiently large to be thought of as a problem with 
either Markovian uncertainty or Bayesian uncertainty while the reference to a learning 
process and Bayesian uncertainty is made more explicit in the subsequent literature. Fisher 
and Hanemann (1987) and Hanemann (1989), for instance, explicitly refer to Bayesian 
uncertainty when focusing on uncertainty about biological and engineering parameters or 
uncertainty as to whether the offshore structures contain oil in commercial quantities. By 
contrast, the analysis of the optimal timing of environmental policies proposed by 
Pindyck (2000) still refers to Markovian uncertainty. 
Second, economists often have other theoretical references than the real option theory 
in mind when dealing with the precautionary principle. Indeed, precautionary saving is a well 
known and extensively concept in macroeconomic dynamics. For many economists, adapting 
the concept of precautionary saving to environmental policies thus seems to be a natural way 
to analyse the precautionary principle. One of the most noticeable articles that obey to this 
logic is that by Gollier et al. (2000). As a result, preferences, and more specifically attitude 
toward risk, play a crucial role in determining whether the precautionary principle is 
theoretically founded or not. This contrasts with the real option theory that may be thought of 
as an advanced Costs Benefits Analysis method specified in terms of monetary units without 
explicit reference to the concept of utility. The fact that models adapted from the concept of 
precautionary saving focuses on continuous choices in a macroeconomic context rather than 
discrete choices in a microeconomic context adds to the gap with the real option theory. 
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Nevertheless, citations of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), considered as the core of the real options 
literature, are still made in works building on the concept of precautionary saving (and more 
specifically in the article by Gollier et al. 2000). 
This article is an attempt to unify the different ways suggested to analyse the 
precautionary principle. It starts with a Bayesian approach to the dynamics of scientific 
knowledge and highlights the role of prior beliefs in the debate about the precautionary 
principle and the importance to accord to the arrival of new information (section 2). We then 
turn to the presentation of a canonical model of Bayesian real option expressed in terms of 
intertemporal utility maximisation (section 3). The optimal exercise rule of the option helps 
identifying rules to balance advantages and disadvantages when facing a discrete choice with 
irreversible but uncertain impacts. These rules are used as a guideline to characterise cost 
effectiveness in the precautionary principle (section 4). For this purpose, a reformulation of 
the canonical Bayesian real option model is proposed in the specific case of a project with 
marginal impact. We more specifically focus on how to switch consistently from a 
specification in terms of utility to a specification in terms of monetary values. 
 
 
2. A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 
 
This section introduces a Bayesian representation of the dynamics of scientific 
knowledge. How to model in a simple setting the arrival of informative but noisy messages 
about potential harmful effects of a project is first examined (2.1). We then turn to a 
discussion of decision errors and illustrate it with the case of a risk of dissemination of 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in agriculture (2.2). We also examine in what 
respect the basic model proposed by Arrow and Fisher (1974) introduces some confusion 
between Markovian and Bayesian approaches to uncertainty. 
 
2.1 Bayesian learning and scientific progress 
 
Since the seminal article of Arrow and Fisher (1974), the prospect of an arrival of new 
information is the core of the analysis of irreversible economic decisions. New information 
takes either the form of the observation of exogenous random shocks (described as Markov 
processes) affecting the evolution of some key variables or the form of messages used to 
revise the beliefs of economic agents. The real option theory typically focuses on the first 
representation of information while the work of AFHH and, more especially, the subsequent 
literature is merely influenced by the second representation. This second representation 
constitutes the basis for modelling scientific uncertainty as regards the irreversible 
consequences of developing an innovative project. It is generally assumed that there is a finite 
set of possible values of the unknown parameter and that there exists an a priori, or 
subjective, discrete probability distribution on this set representing the beliefs about the true 
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value of the unknown parameter. Messages arriving with time are used to revise the 
probability distribution. Some basic or intuitive properties of the revision process are 
expected. First of all, uncertainty decreases in the long term. This means that the probability 
for one of the possible values tends to increase with time while the probability assigned to 
other values tend to decrease. Some authors rule out the eventuality of contradictory 
messages, which allows representing the evolution of knowledge as an information structure 
which becomes finest as time goes
2
. As a result, the evolution of probabilities assigned to the 
different possible values of the unknown parameter is monotonic. If the eventuality of 
contradictory or noisy messages arriving at different dates is not ruled out, the evolution of 
probabilities is not monotonic: it may be the case that a probability increases and then 
decreases on two successive periods of time. Kolstad (1996a) for instance takes account of 
such noisy messages. Then, the evolution of probabilities may be viewed as a stochastic 
process with an attractor corresponding to a vector made of zeros except one of its 
components (that associated to the correct value of the unknown parameter) equal to unity. 
Another important property of the evolution of beliefs is that the revision of probabilities may 
be consistent with the probability theory, more especially with Bayes’ theorem. This point has 
not always received attention in the literature dealing with irreversible decision when facing 
uncertainty. A noticeable exception is the article by Kelly and Kolstad (1999). Though their 
model is not formalised in terms of real options, it has set the intuition for our canonical 
model. 
Consider an innovative project intended to generate an additional flow of revenues for 
all future dates. Nevertheless, there are threats that developing the project generates 
irreversible though uncertain damages. Uncertainty affects damages in the sense that two 
scenarios are envisaged. The optimistic scenario refers to the case where the development of 
the project does not generate damages and, conversely, the pessimistic scenario refers to the 
case where the development of the project generates damages. Whether damages are 
generated by the project or not is known with certainty only once the project is developed. 
Before the project is developed, economic agents have beliefs about what is the correct 
scenario. Beliefs are based on common and public but costly information. C  denotes the 
deterministic flow of investigation costs that has to be incurred on one unit of time to 
eventually receive additional information with probability 1  where  is the probability 
that the investigation yields no new result. Investigation costs are expressed in terms of 
consumption units. Probability  of receiving additional information on one period of time 
for a given investigation cost C  may be thought of as a rough measure of the speed of 
knowledge acquisition. Due to the arrival of information through time, beliefs are nor static 
but dynamic. Beliefs are represented by subjective probabilities associated to each scenario. 
                                                 
2 This is typically the case in Freixas and Laffont (1984) or Kolstad (1996b) who merely follow the primary model of 
Henry (1974). 
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Let X t  (respectively X t1 ) denote the subjective probability at time t  that the true scenario 
is the optimistic (respectively pessimistic) scenario. In order to make the dynamics of X t  
more explicit, we consider that they are two types of informative messages that may be 
received on one period of time. The first type is a message M a  which is more likely when the 
correct scenario is the optimistic scenario. M a  is received with probability (conditional on the 
arrival of an informative message) 21p
a
 if the correct scenario is the optimistic scenario 
and with probability (conditional on the arrival of an informative message) 211 p
b
 if the 
correct scenario is the pessimistic scenario. The second type of message is a message M b  
which is more likely when the correct scenario is the pessimistic scenario. M b  is received 
with probability (conditional on the arrival of an informative message) 21p
b
 if the correct 
scenario is the pessimistic scenario and with probability (conditional on the arrival of an 
informative message) 211 p
a
 if the correct scenario is the optimistic scenario. 
Accordingly, given that an informative message is received, economic agents consider that 
there is a probability pXpX btat
a
t 11Pr  that it is a message M a  and a probability 
pXpX btat
b
t 11Pr  that it is a message M b . Probabilities pa  and pb  are objective 
probabilities known by all economic agents. As a result, economic agents are assumed to 
revise their beliefs on the correct scenario by applying Bayes’ theorem. This yields the 
dynamics of beliefs illustrated by Figure 1. A key feature of the stochastic process X t  
representing these beliefs is that it admits two absorbing points which are respectively 0X t  
and 1X t . This is consistent with the fact that X t  is a probability and does not take values 
outside the interval 1,0  when starting from the interior of this interval. It also reflects the 
fact that when economic agents have no doubts about what is the correct scenario they will 
never change their beliefs whatever the type and number of new messages received. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
 
 
2.2 Bayesian learning and decision errors: an example 
 
In the context of the use of GMO for agricultural purposes, investigation takes the 
form of scientific tests to determine whether a GMO plant may disseminate easily or not. The 
optimistic scenario corresponds to the absence of dissemination. In this case, producers 
adopting the GMO plant do it in their own interest so that there are exclusively net benefits. 
The pessimistic scenario corresponds to a significant dissemination of the GMO plant, more 
specifically dissemination on fields devoted to organic agriculture. As a result products 
harvested on these fields no longer conform to the rules of organic agriculture and cannot be 
sold under the organic label, thus implying a loss for organic producers. For the problem to 
make sense, the loss incurred by organic producers is supposed to exceed the benefit of 
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farmers adopting the GMO plant so that there is a net loss. Scientific tests may invalidate 
some factors alleged to induce GMO dissemination. Such a conclusion is logically more 
likely to occur under the optimistic scenario and is assimilated to a message of type M a . 
Conversely, scientific tests may confirm factors alleged to induce GMO dissemination. Such a 
conclusion is assimilated to message of type M b  because it is more likely to occur under the 
pessimistic scenario. Probability p
b
1  reflects the risk that no dissemination is proven by 
scientific tests in spite of its existence, due to measurement errors and/or inappropriate 
protocols. Probability p
a
1  captures the risk that a conclusion in favour of dissemination is 
obtained whereas the correct scenario is that without dissemination. Such a risk originates in 
errors in the protocol or manipulations and is clearly expected to be far lower than the 
previous risk. These two types of risk are referred to as the risk of first type and the risk of 
second type in statistics. Table 1 adapted from Dorman (2005) helps illustrating the nature of 
the risk conditionally on the correct scenario and the decision. It also helps understanding the 
debate between the partisans of GMOs and their opponents. On the one hand, partisans of 
GMOs stress the risk of a ban of GMOs whereas they may constitute a major innovation for 
economic and human progress. What they have in mind is the risk of first type. By sometime 
disregarding the risk of second type they implicitly reveal that they believe without doubt that 
the correct scenario is the optimistic scenario (i.e. 10X ). On the other hand, opponents to 
GMOs point out the threat of an irreversible dissemination of GMO plants and thus have in 
mind the risk of second type. They sometime do not mention the risk of banning a harmless 
and profitable innovation and thus implicitly reveal that they believe without doubt that the 
correct scenario is the pessimistic scenario (i.e. 00X ). For this two polar positions, 
scientific investigation aiming at obtaining additional information is worthless because both 
1X t  and 0X t  are absorbing points of the stochastic process describing the dynamics of 
beliefs and thus both extreme partisans and extreme opponents are locked in their initial 
beliefs. Scientific investigation makes sense only in the presence of some initial doubts. A 
reasonable position could consist for instance in affecting a same probability (i.e. 210X ) 
to each scenario to reflect the absence of a priori about the problem at stake. Beliefs then 
evolve through time as new information is received and how the risks of first and second 
types should be balanced is a dynamic matter. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
What distinguishes our modelling assumptions form the standard model of Arrow and 
Fisher (1974) and the subsequent works applying the real option theory to the analysis of 
optimal choice when facing risk and irreversibility is the explicit Bayesian nature of the 
underlying stochastic process. Indeed, the dynamics of beliefs used in Arrow and 
Fisher (1974) is obtained as the peculiar case of the stochastic process described in Figure 1 
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with 0 , 0p
a
 and 0p
b
. Said less formally, Arrow and Fisher (1974) consider an 
informative message is received for sure and, moreover, it is not a noisy message. As a result, 
waiting one period of time enables switching from incomplete to complete information so that 
the dynamics of the problem is fully handle by a two period model. From a technical point of 
view, these additional assumptions imply that the stochastic process does not depart from a 
standard Markovian process. This is less obvious if errors of first type  and/or errors of second 
type are introduced. 
 
 
3. A BAYSIAN REAL OPTION APPROACH TO THE OPTIMAL DEVELOPMENT DECISION 
 
This section starts with the decision problem of a public authority having to maximise 
the intertemporal utility of a representative agent. Reference to the agent’s preferences is thus 
explicit but the problem departs from a standard model of precautionary saving by the discrete 
nature of the decision (3.1). It is shown that the optimal decision rule may be determined as 
the optimal exercise rule of a real option problem (3.2). A numerical example is provided to 
highlight how the perspective of acquiring costly information may drastically reduce the set of 
state of beliefs for which either definitive abandonment or immediate development is optimal, 
thus calling for postponement of project and further scientific investigation about its 
consequences (3.3). 
 
3.1 The decision problem 
 
The public nature of the decision to develop or not the innovative project in the 
canonical problem introduced in the previous section arises from two elements. First, as they 
generally correspond to previously unobserved phenomena, no mechanism exists to 
internalise the potential harmful impacts of the development of the innovative project. 
Second, scientific knowledge is a non rival good the production of which is suboptimal if let 
to private economic agents. With these two elements in mind, we consider a public authority 
facing the problem to either abandon the innovative project or develop it immediately or 
postpone the development while financing scientific investigations about its consequences. 
There is a representative agent or equivalently numerous identical agents with an additive 
intertemporal utility where QYu ,  stands for the instantaneous utility function and  
denotes the utility discount rate. The instantaneous utility function depends on the 
consumption level Y  and on the level Q  of environmental quality or health. Consumption 
amounts to y  units in the absence of development and scientific investigation. In case of an 
immediate development of the project, the consumption level raises to By
~
 where B
~
 is the 
random additional benefit expressed in terms of consumption units that the project generates 
for all future dates. In the optimistic scenario, environmental quality (or health) is preserved 
when the project is developed so that Q  remains equal to its initial level q . The instantaneous 
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utility level is then given by qByu ,
~
. Conversely, the pessimistic scenario implies that Q  
falls to Dq
~
 where D
~
 is the measure of random damages in physical terms and the resulting 
instantaneous utility level for all future dates is DqByu
~
,
~
. The exact values of 
additional consumption and damages are unknown until the project is developed. Risk as 
regards these values is introduced in order to analyse the impact of risk aversion and link our 
results to that of Gollier et al. (2000). B
~
 and D
~
 have known probability distributions. For the 
problem to make sense we also assume that qyuDqByu ,
~
,
~
 whatever the 
realisations of B
~
 and D
~
. Finally, the consumption level is given by Cy  as long as 
postponement of the development and further scientific investigation is decided, which yields 
the instantaneous utility level qCyu , . The public authority seeks to maximise the 
intertemporal expected utility of the representative agent. In case of abandonment, the 
intertemporal utility level is deterministic and defined by 
 
 W
A  
0 1
,
t
t
qyu
 
  qyu ,
1
 (1) 
 
In case of an immediate development without damages, the intertemporal expected utility 
level is given by the same expression with qByuE ,
~
 in place of qyu , . The 
corresponding expression in case of damages deserves more attention. Indeed it is not 
standard to use the expected utility model with a utility function having two random 
arguments. Therefore, we first express the instantaneous utility level obtained with the 
pessimistic scenario in terms of the willingness to pay W
~
 for preserving environmental 
quality or health. By definition we have DqByuqWByu
~
,
~
,
~~
 so that only the 
first argument of the instantaneous utility function is random. Accordingly, the intertemporal 
expected utility level in case of damages is given by the same expression than (1) with 
qLyuE ,
~
 in place of qyu ,  where BWL
~~~
 stands for random net equivalent losses 
expressed in consumption units and associated with damages to the environment or health. 
Note that the second argument in u  remains unchanged whatever the situation considered. In 
order to make notations more concise we thus replace u  by v  with consumption as the sole 
argument thereafter. Function v  may be interpreted as an indirect utility function. Therefore, 
the expected intertemporal utility level, conditional on information received so far, when 
immediate development is decided but just before development reveals whether there are 
damages or not is defined as 
 
 LyvEXByvEXXW ttt
D ~11
~1
 (2) 
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Postponing the development while financing scientific investigation about its consequences 
yields the instantaneous utility level qCyuCyv ,  at the current date plus the 
expected discounted intertemporal utility level corresponding to the optimal choice between 
definitive abandonment, postponement with scientific investigation and immediate 
development at the next date. Therefore, the optimal expected intertemporal utility level at the 
current date is given by 
 
 
XW
pX
W
pX
WXW
Cyv
W
MaxXW
t
D
b
t
atb
ta
t
ata
tt
A
t
1
Pr
1*Pr
Pr
*Pr1
*
*
  (3) 
 
The expected optimal intertemporal utility level at the next date in case of postponement is 
defined on the basis of the dynamics of beliefs described in Figure 1. With probability  no 
additional informative message is received in spite of scientific investigation. The optimal 
intertemporal utility level then remains unchanged. With probability Pr1
a
t  it is believed 
that a message of type M a  will be received and thus that an upward revision to 
Pr1
a
tatt
pXX  of the beliefs that the optimistic scenario is the correct one will occur at date 
1t . Conversely, it is believed that a message of type M b  will be received with probability 
Pr1
b
t  and that a downward revision to Pr11
b
tatt
pXX  of the beliefs that the 
optimistic scenario is the correct one will occur at date 1t . 
Whether postponement has to be preferred to definitive abandonment or immediate 
development crucially depends on the state of beliefs X t . If there were non perspectives of 
acquiring additional information through time (i.e. if 1) it would never be optimal to 
postpone the decision. Indeed, it would imply to incur the investigation cost without 
perspectives to change the state of beliefs. This also happens if beliefs are locked to 1X t  or 
0X t , even if informative messages are received. According to the discussion made in the 
previous section about the respective positions of extreme opponents and extreme partisans of 
the development of innovative projects susceptible to have harmful impacts on the 
environment and /or health, this explains why both of them reject the idea of further scientific 
investigations. Whatever the reason, if the perspective of acquiring more information is 
disregarded, the optimal choice consists in developing immediately the project when 
WXW
A
t
D  and definitely abandon it otherwise. Using (1) and (2), it is easily checked that 
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immediate development is preferred if and only if X t  exceeds a threshold value defined as a 
ratio of variations for the instantaneous utility level: 
 
 XXWXW t
A
t
D  (4.a) 
 
with 
 
 
LyvEByvE
LyvEyv
X ~~
~
 (4.b) 
 
If the perspective of acquiring more information is taken into account, a definitive 
abandonment of the project as soon as XX t  could reveal to be suboptimal at the next date. 
It more specifically happens if messages of type M a  (leading to an increase of X t ) are 
received. Conversely, an immediate development of the project as soon as XX t  could be 
regretted if the pessimistic scenario reveals to be the correct one. Indded, waiting just one 
period of time more could induce the receipt of a message M b  leading to a drop of X t  and 
thus justifying not to develop the project. Therefore, taking account of the arrival of additional 
information, it is optimal postponing the decision to abandon or develop the project as long as 
beliefs stay inside an interval XX
DA ,  where XX
A  is the lower bound behind which 
definitive abandonment is optimal and XX
D  is the upper bound above which immediate 
development is optimal. In mathematical terminology,  is the optimal waiting region of the 
optimal stopping time problem defined by (3). The optimality of this form of waiting region is 
checked ex post by verifying that the resulting intertemporal utility level XW t
*  exceeds 
both W
A  and XW t
D  for values of X t  in . 
 
 
3.2 The option value of additional information 
 
The optimal thresholds X
A  and X
D  are find by solving the optimal stopping time 
problem (3). For this purpose, note that as long as X t  lies inside the optimal waiting region 
 the value function XW t
*  satisfies the following definition 
 
 XW t
*  Cyv  
  
1
*
XW t  
  XXX
pX
W
pX
W
DA
t
b
t
atb
ta
t
ata
t
,
1
Pr
1
Pr
Pr
Pr
1
**
 (6) 
 
This is nothing else than the discrete time version of the Bellman equation characterising 
option values in continuous time real options problems. Substitution shows that the 
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homogeneous part of the equation has solutions of the form 
XXXXKXW ttttt 11
* , provided  is a root of the characteristic equation 
 
 p
p
p
p
p
p
b
b
a
b
b
a
1
1
11
1
 (7) 
 
For a strictly positive discount rate  the left hand side of equation (7) is a positive, higher 
than unity, constant. Let h  denote the right hand side of equation (7). It is easily checked 
that 10h  and 11h . Moreover, given that 21p
a
 and 21p
b
 some computations 
lead to the conclusion that hlim , hlim , 0h  and 
0h  with 1,0 . As illustrated by Figure 2, we can conclude that (7) has 
two roots satisfying 11  and 02 . Then, solutions of the homogeneous part of equation 
(6) are linear combinations of the two independent solutions 
XXXXXf ttttt 11
1
1
 and XXXXXf ttttt 11
2
2
. Solutions to 
the complete equation (6) are obtained by adding the particular solution 
 
 CyvW
P 1  (8) 
 
A parallel with (1) shows that this particular solution defines the intertemporal utility level in 
case of permanent postponement and investigation. Of course, it is expected that 
postponement will not be permanent and that at some date in the future a sufficient amount of 
information will be acquired so that it will be optimal to either abandon the project or develop 
it. This perspective justifies incurring the investigation cost for acquiring more information 
and generates an option value, expressed in terms of utility, that adds to W
P  in order to obtain 
XW t
* . The expression of this option value XOV t  is given by the general solution to the 
homogeneous part of equation (6). Therefore 
 
 
XOV
XfKXfK
W
CyvXW
t
tt
P
t 2211
* 1  (9) 
 
Where the two constants K1  and K 2  remain to be determined on the basis of the behaviour of 
the value function XW t
*  at the boundaries of the waiting region. 
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
 
 13 
 
3.3 Solution to the optimal stopping problem 
 
By definition, at the lower bound X
A  of the waiting region the public decider is just 
indifferent between postponing the development of the innovative project and definitely 
abandoning it. As a result the following condition holds 
 
 WXW
AA*  (10.a) 
 
Similarly, at the upper bound X
D  of the waiting region the public decider is just indifferent 
between postponing the development of the innovative project and immediately realising it. 
This yields the second boundary condition 
 
 XWXW
DDD*  (10.b) 
 
In the terminology of optimal stopping time problems, (10.a) and (10.b) are the “value 
matching” conditions. Solving simultaneously (10.a) and (10.b) with respect to K1  and K 2  
generates expressions XXK
DA ,1  and XXK
DA ,2  of these two constants as functions of 
the two thresholds X
A  and X
D . These two expressions are the only way by which the levels 
of X
A  and X
D  affect the level of the value function XW t
* . The other conditions required 
to obtain X
A  and X
D  are the “smooth pasting” conditions
3
 
 
 0* XW
A
X  (11.a) 
 
and 
 
 XWXW
DD
X
D
X
*  (11.b) 
 
Where XW tX
*  and XW t
D
X  respectively stand for the first derivative of XW t
*  and 
XW t
D  with respect to X t . It seems that it is not possible to obtain an analytical solution for 
X
A  and X
D . Therefore we turn to a numerical solution to illustrate the optimal decision rule 
and visualise the importance of the additional intertemporal expected utility generated by the 
opportunity to postpone realisation of the project in order to acquire more information. The 
instantaneous indirect utility function is assumed to take the form yyv  and parameters 
values used for the numerical application are 6.0p
a
, 9.0p
b
, 1.0 , 5.0 , 03.0 , 
100y , 10B , 25L  and 1C . The associated optimal thresholds values are 
246074.0X
A  and 88062.0X
D . Figure 3 confirms that XW t
*  exceeds W
A  and XW t
D  
for all values of X t  between X
A  and X
D . The threshold to be used in the absence of the 
                                                 
3
 See Brekke and Oksendal (1991), Dumas (1991) or Dixit (1993) for technical details on the link between the 
optimality of the thresholds values and the smooth pasting conditions. Sodal (1998), Dixit et al. (1999) or 
Shackleton and Sodal (2005) provide an alternative, equivalent but more intuitive for economists, explanation of 
optimality conditions for basic option problems. 
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opportunity to acquire new informative messages as time goes is 732969.0X . The optimal 
waiting region is not centred on this latter value but extends more on its left than on its right. 
The perspective to acquire additional information thus plays more in favour of a reduction of 
the range of beliefs that justifies definitive abandonment of the project than in favour of a 
reduction of the range of beliefs in favour of an immediate realisation of the project. In spite 
of a wide optimal waiting region, the supplement of intertemporal expected utility generated 
by the opportunity to postpone the project and pay for additional information remains rather 
limited. It amounts at most to %26.1  of W
A  at XX . 
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
 
 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF INNOVATIVE PROJECTS 
 
When facing projects without macroeconomic incidence, public authorities generally 
implement a Costs Benefits Analysis. This section examines how to make such a Costs 
Benefits Analysis consistent with the approach to the precautionary principle developed so far 
in the article. Rewriting the problem in terms of monetary units requires adding corrections to 
gross measures of costs and benefits in order to correctly take account of preferences (4.1). 
The real option model with Bayesian learning presented in the previous section may then be 
converted from a problem in terms of utility to a problem in terms of monetary units (4.2). 
 
4.1 Switching from utility to monetary units 
 
Implementing Cost Benefit Analysis to the problem of developing, abandoning or 
postponing the innovative project presumes that net benefits and net losses incurred in case of 
development but also investigation costs associated to postponement are small compared to 
the initial consumption level y . The indirect utility function may then be replaced by its 
second order approximation in the neighbourhood of the initial consumption level. In the case 
of postponement, the instantaneous utility function is thus replaced by 
 
 CyvCyvyvCyv
221  (12) 
 
Moreover, utility terms have to be converted in monetary units by dividing by the marginal 
utility level yv . We then obtain the following decomposition of (12) 
 
 
m
C
yv
yv
C
v
yv
yv
v
yv
Cyv
pap
221  (13) 
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where v p  is the instantaneous utility level in terms of monetary units obtained in case of 
postponement and investigation whereas va  is the instantaneous utility level in terms of 
monetary units obtained in case of abandonment. Postponing the project to benefit from 
scientific investigations not only induces the additional investigation cost C  compared to 
abandonment but also an additional monetary value referred to as expression m p . Given that 
the marginal utility of consumption is positive but decreasing, m p  is a cost. Imposing constant 
marginal utility of consumption is the only way to obtain a value of zero for m p . Therefore, 
m p  is interpreted as the equivalent monetary penalty to be added to the investigation cost C  
to take account of the decreasing marginal utility of consumption. Substituting L
~
 to C  in 
(13), taking expectation and noting that the variance of net losses is given by 
222 ~
LtL LE  
with LE
L
~
 their expected value, we obtain a somewhat similar decomposition of the 
monetary equivalent vL  of the instantaneous utility level in case of development and net 
losses 
 
 
L
LLL
aL
t
yv
yv
m
yv
yv
v
yv
yv
v
yv
LyvE
L
22 2121
~
 (14) 
 
In addition to the monetary penalty mL  due to the decreasing marginal utility of consumption, 
the expected loss 
L
 is also reduced by the Arrow Pratt approximation L  of the risk 
premium. The fact that both the decreasing marginal utility of consumption and risk aversion 
are captured by the concavity of the instantaneous utility function implies that mL  and L  
have close expressions. The decomposition is almost identical except the negative sign of the 
second term of the right hand side in case of development and net benefits: 
 
 
B
BBB
aB
yv
yv
m
yv
yv
v
yv
yv
v
yv
ByvE
B
22 2121
~
 (15) 
 
where 
B
 and 2B  respectively denote the expected value and variance of net benefits. Note 
that whether losses or benefits are considered, taking account of the marginal utility of 
consumption always yields a penalty. 
 
 
4.2 Precautionary principle in terms of costs and benefits 
 
The next step to switch from the utility maximisation problem to a Cost Benefit 
Analysis problem consists in rewriting program (3) in terms of variations of the expected 
intertemporal utility level compared to the level W
A  obtained with abandonment and dividing 
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all expressions by the marginal indirect utility yv  to convert all terms in monetary units. 
Using approximations (13) (14) and (15) and proceeding along the same lines than in section 
3, the option value is now defined in monetary units by two constants yvKK 11  and 
yvKK 22  that solve the following two “value matching” boundary conditions replacing 
boundary conditions (10.a) and (10.b) 
 
 0
1
2211 XfKXfKmC
AA
p  (16.a) 
 XfKXfKmC
DD
p 2211
1
 
 LLL
D
BBB
D
mXmX
1
1
1
 (16.b) 
 
The optimal thresholds X
A  and X
D  of beliefs solve the following “smooth pasting” 
conditions that replace boundary conditions (11.a) and (11.b) 
 
 0
2211 XfKXfK
A
X
A
X
 (17.a) 
 XfKXfK
D
X
D
X 2211 LLLBBB mm
1
 (17.b) 
 
where the subscript X  is used to denote the derivative of functions with respect to the state of 
beliefs. 
Finally, boundary conditions (16.a), (16.b), (17.a) and (17.b) are those obtained when 
directly solving the optimal stopping time problem defined by 
 
 
t
LLL
t
t
BBB
t
b
t
atb
ta
t
ata
tt
pt
m
X
m
X
pX
V
pX
VXV
mCMaxXV
1
1
1
1
Pr
1
Pr
Pr
Pr1
0
  (18) 
 
Expression (18) corresponds to (3) expressed in terms of monetary costs and benefits. XV t  
is the monetary option value of postponing the project to acquire additional information at the 
cost mC p , to be thought of as the exercise price of the option. Abandonment yields a 
monetary value of zero corresponding to the first line in (18). Development of the project 
generates the flow BBB m  of benefits for all future dates if the optimistic scenario is the 
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true scenario whereas the flow LLL m  of losses is generated if the pessimistic 
scenario is correct. Both flows are discounted at rate  and corrected to take account of 
decreasing marginal utility of consumption and risk aversion. By this way, preferences and 
attitude toward risk affect the optimal decision rule. Given the current state of beliefs X t , 
development of the project yields the expected discounted monetary value that appears in the 
third line of (18). According to (18), the project is valued by the expected discounted sum of 
benefits and losses, respectively weighted by the current beliefs that the correct scenario is the 
optimistic scenario or the pessimistic one, if and only if immediate development is optimal. 
This occurs when XX
D
t . The project is worthless if the current beliefs in favour of the 
optimistic scenario fall below the threshold X
A . Finally, the project is valued at the option 
value 
 
 XfKXfKmCXV ttpt 2211
1
 (19) 
 
for all states of beliefs such that X t  is in the range XX
DA , . This value may be used, for 
instance, to define the maximal initial investment cost that justifies not abandoning the 
project. The optimal exercise rule of the real option highlights how to balance costs and 
benefits in the presence of evolving scientific uncertainty about potential irreversible impacts. 
Costs and benefits are not only weighted by current beliefs, they also play a key role in 
defining the optimal thresholds of the state of beliefs above which immediate realisation of 
the project is optimal and below which definitive abandonment has to be chosen. As regard 
this second effect, their influence is highly non linear if the perspective of acquiring costly 
additional information is properly taken into account. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The canonical model developed in this article is intended to provide a guideline for 
implementing the precautionary principle in Cost Benefit Analysis. First, it builds on the real 
option theory but extends it to Bayesian learning processes instead of the standard Markovian 
processes generally postulated in the literature. This extension makes the real option approach 
more consistent with the logic of evolving scientific knowledge that is at the core of the 
precautionary principle and results from a costly search for additional information. Second it 
conciliates the real approach to precautionary principle and the strand of literature that 
analyses the precautionary principle by adapting the concept of precautionary saving to 
environmental preservation. This suggests applying two kinds of correction to flows of costs 
and benefits. The first correction is intended to take account of the marginal utility of 
consumption. The second correction follows on from risk aversion and takes the form of a 
risk premium. Using standard method of resolution of real options models, it is then shown 
 18 
how corrected costs and benefits influence the choice between abandoning, realising or 
postponing innovative projects with uncertain but irreversible potential harmful effects. 
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Figure 1 
Dynamics of beliefs 
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Figure 2 
Solutions to the characteristic equation 
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Figure 3 
Optimal waiting region and intertemporal expected utility levels as function of the state of 
beliefs in the numerical example.  
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Table 1 
Typology of decision errors 
 
    
    
  Correct scenario : 
  H 0  
Optimistic scenario 
H 1  
Pessimistic scenario 
H 0  No error Error of type 2 
Conclusion : 
H 1  Error of type 1 No error 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
